Powerful Politicians, Political Costs, and Income Smoothing: Evidence from a Natural Experiment by Jung, Sumi
  
 
 
 
 
Powerful Politicians, Political Costs, and Income Smoothing:  
Evidence from a Natural Experiment 
 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION 
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE 
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA 
BY 
 
 
 
 
SUMI JUNG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
ADVISER: PERVIN SHROFF 
 
 
 
JULY 2015 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Sumi Jung 2015 
 
  i 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my adviser, Pervin Shroff. I would not have been 
able to complete this dissertation without her guidance, support, and encouragement.  
 
I am also truly grateful to Zhaoyang Gu and Ivy Zhang for their guidance and support during my 
doctoral study. I would like to thank Mozaffar Khan and Paul Glewwe for giving their valuable 
time to serve on my committee and for providing constructive feedback. I also thank the 
Minnesota accounting faculty and fellow Ph.D. students for their helpful comments and 
suggestions.  
 
Finally, I thank my family and friends who helped and supported me to come this far.   
 
 
   
  ii 
Abstract 
This paper investigates whether and how firms receiving benefits through their connections to 
politicians use accounting discretion to avoid the cost associated with negative publicity. I use a 
unique setting that captures the change in political costs arising from chairmanship appointments 
to influential Senate committees. Appointments to committee chairmanship constitute exogenous 
shocks, scattered across states and years. Preferential treatment of firms in the home state of a 
promoted chairman is likely to draw public scrutiny, providing these firms with incentives to 
dampen large profits by smoothing earnings to reduce potential political backlash. Using a 
difference-in-difference research design, I find evidence that, following the promotion of their 
senator, home-state firms smooth their earnings over the years of the chairman's tenure. The 
smoothing behavior reduces in the period after the chairman vacates the office, consistent with a 
decline in benefits and the associated political scrutiny. Cross-sectional analysis shows that these 
effects are stronger for firms expected to receive higher political benefits and consequently higher 
public scrutiny. Overall, the paper provides evidence of the political cost hypothesis using a 
comprehensive sample of firms across many years and industries. It highlights the role of political 
connections in shaping firms' financial reporting strategies.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper investigates whether and how firms receiving benefits through their connections to 
politicians use accounting discretion to avoid negative publicity. Since political power is 
associated with potentially negative consequences of scrutiny, it creates incentives for managers 
to make accounting choices to manage political costs (Watts and Zimmerman 1978). Prior studies 
test the political cost hypothesis using small-sample or industry-specific settings over short 
horizons and provide evidence suggesting that firms engage in downward earnings management 
to minimize expected political costs.
1
 In this paper, I use a comprehensive sample of firms to test 
this hypothesis by exploiting a unique setting that captures the change in firms’ political costs 
arising from chairmanship appointments to influential Senate committees. Besides providing 
more general rather than industry-specific evidence, this setting provides a natural experiment to 
test the effect of an exogenous change in political power on firms' discretionary accounting 
choices.  
Promotion to the leadership position bestows additional power on the chairman to 
influence distributive politics and various policies, and enables him to benefit his constituencies, 
including companies in his home state. For example, Cohen, Coval, and Malloy (2011) show that 
a politician’s ascension to a committee chair brings in a significant increase in federal funds such 
as earmarks and government contracts to his state. Preferential treatment of firms in the home 
state of a promoted chairman is likely to draw public scrutiny and thus make these firms 
politically visible. The media and public watchdog organizations play a central role in spreading 
negative publicity against these firms by providing organized information to the public. This 
negative publicity, in turn, can lead to adverse government and regulatory action, potentially 
                                                 
1
 Settings studied by prior research include anti-trust investigations (Cahan 1992), rapid oil price increases 
(Han and Wang 1998), cable television industry (Key 1997), and insurance industry (Grace and Leverty 
2010). 
   
2 
imposing political costs on companies in the promoted chairman’s state. I hypothesize that, given 
the large value at stake, these firms are likely to take action to minimize the consequences of 
negative publicity.
2
 Specifically, I test whether these firms exploit their financial reporting 
discretion to reduce their political visibility.
3
  
I expect that firms in the home states of the promoted chairs, facing political pressure, 
will engage in income smoothing to mask the increase in benefits after the promotional shock, 
consistent with the political cost hypothesis. These firms, already under the public radar, are more 
likely to draw additional media attention when they report large profits. The sizeable income 
generated by firms that are geographically connected to powerful politicians may be perceived as 
benefits accruing from their political ties and may exacerbate public criticism. Therefore, firms 
have incentives to avoid reporting large profits to reduce the likelihood of potential political 
backlash.
4
 I predict that these firms will attempt to dampen their performance by smoothing 
earnings over the period of the chairmanship. Average tenure of chairmen of Senate committees 
is 7.6 years and this multi-period nature of committee chairmanship makes income smoothing a 
more natural medium to disguise firms' true performance over a longer time horizon than 
downward earnings management.
5
  
                                                 
2
 A 2013 report in McKinsey Quarterly estimates that this value at stake is about 30 percent of corporate 
earnings in most industries. 
 
3
 Companies also use other tactics to influence government policies, e.g., lobbying and political 
contributions. Another example of such tactics is “managing the media.” To affect media coverage, firms 
can hire investor relations firms (Solomon 2012) and/or control the timing of  press releases (Solomon and 
Soltes 2012). 
   
4
 This idea was first suggested by Watts and Zimmerman (1978). Hall (1993) also argues that “the extent of 
any political backlash depends in part on the size of the reported profits.” For example, Halliburton, with its 
ties to former U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney, was heavily criticized for securing large profits from 
defense contracts.  
 
5
 Other studies of the political cost hypothesis examine downward earnings management as a one-shot 
strategy over short horizons (e.g., Ramanna and Roychowdhury 2010). In my setting, downward earnings 
management is less likely to be sustainable for consecutive years over the longer time horizon covering the 
chairman's tenure.     
   
3 
Although the home state of the promoted politician is, overall, expected to gain from his 
increased power (e.g., Cohen et al. 2011), it is important to identify firms that are most likely to 
benefit from the promotion to increase the power of the test. To identify such firms, I select 
industries based on the proportion of sales to the U.S. government, since firms in industries 
reliant on government contracts are likely to benefit the most and, thus, face higher political costs 
from government disfavor (Karpoff et al. 1999; Mills et al. 2013). Accordingly, my main sample 
consists of firms in 42 industries with greater than 3% of annual industry sales to the U.S. 
government from 1971 to 2012. 
The chairmanship of U.S. congressional committees is based on seniority. The member 
from the controlling party with the longest tenure on a committee is promoted to be the chairman 
when the incumbent is defeated in an election, resigns, dies, or the controlling party changes after 
an election. Since these events that trigger a change in chairmanship are unpredictable, the 
appointment of a committee chairman is exogenous (Roberts 1990). Therefore, seniority-based 
leadership changes in Senate committees provide a natural experiment to test the political cost 
hypothesis. An advantage of this setting, relative to other industry- or time-specific settings used 
in the political cost literature, is that these exogenous leadership changes in powerful committees 
affect numerous states at different times. During the sample period, there were 73 newly 
promoted chairmen from 43 different states for 10 different Senate committees considered in this 
study.
6
 These scattered promotional shocks enable me to use a difference-in-difference research 
design which is effective in ruling out the alternative explanation that other concurrent events 
might drive the results. Specifically, I compare changes in income smoothing from the pre- to the 
post-promotion periods for firms headquartered in the new chairman’s state to changes in income 
smoothing over the same period for control firms in other states.  
                                                 
6
 My sample includes 103 instances of changes in leadership considering both chairman and ranking 
minority member (i.e., the senior-most member of the minority party).  
   
4 
I first verify whether sample firms benefit from the home-state senator's promotion to the 
chairmanship of a Senate committee. I find supporting evidence that the operating performance of 
the sample firms in the home state improves significantly after the promotion. I also find a 
significant increase in government contracts to these firms following their senator’s rise to power, 
suggesting that government contracts are used as a channel of the politician’s influence consistent 
with prior political science literature on distributive politics (e.g., Ferejohn 1974). Further, I find 
improved stock price performance of these firms following their senator’s new chairmanship 
appointment, which suggests that investors too perceive that these firms are likely to benefit from 
their senator’s promotion.  
 Having established the positive impact of promotion shocks, I then investigate whether 
the treatment firms engage in income smoothing to dampen the magnitude of their gains. I use 
two measures of income smoothing that are standard in the literature (e.g., Leuz et al. 2003): ratio 
of the standard deviation of income before extraordinary items to the standard deviation of cash 
flows from operations and the correlation between the change in total accruals and the change in 
cash flow from operations (multiplied by -1 so that higher values indicate higher income 
smoothing). These two measures are calculated using the current year’s and past four years’ 
observations. I also use a composite measure of income smoothing by averaging the reversed 
fractional rankings of these two measures. I examine whether the firm engages in income 
smoothing up to seven years after promotion to coincide with the average chairman's tenure. 
Consistent with the political cost hypothesis, I find that the treatment firms are more likely to 
smooth earnings after home state senator’s ascension to a committee chair. This result is robust to 
various income smoothing measures and different definitions of powerful committees and 
promotion shocks. In addition, I find that firm performance as well as the degree of income 
   
5 
smoothing decrease after the chairman vacates the position further corroborating the idea that 
leadership changes in Senate committees affect firms’ reporting choices.  
I also investigate whether incentives to smooth earnings vary with different firm- or 
shock-specific attributes reflecting the magnitude of potential political costs. I find that firms with 
a higher level of government contract intensity engage in more income smoothing, implying that 
these firms have greater incentives to dampen high performance as they face greater political 
costs from the same events. I also show that the tendency to smooth earnings is stronger for firms 
in constituencies of relatively junior senators promoted to chairman. This is consistent with the 
notion that additional power and benefits from the promotion are limited for the already powerful 
senior senators and, thus, firms in constituencies of junior senators are likely to have a relatively 
greater increase in benefits and therefore will be more exposed to further public scrutiny. 
Additionally, I find that the increase in income smoothing following the promotion is more 
pronounced for home-state firms who provide contributions to the promoted chairman’s political 
campaign, supporting the idea that these firms, with stronger ties to the senator, are exposed to 
higher public attention and political costs. Collectively, these results suggest that firms’ 
incentives to smooth earnings in the presence of negative publicity vary with expected political 
costs consistent with the political cost hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman 1978).  
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, this paper extends the 
literature on the political cost hypothesis by providing evidence using the setting of a politician’s 
appointment to a powerful position that leads to increased political costs for a broader set of 
home-state companies. Since promotional shocks are scattered over various states and years, this 
setting enables me to test a large sample of firms in numerous industries and has the potential to 
provide sharper evidence on the political cost hypothesis.  
   
6 
Second, this study also contributes to the growing literature on political connections by 
documenting how firms’ geographic ties to politicians affect firm performance as well as 
financial reporting. Using firm location as the basis for political connection and politician’s 
promotion as the source of exogenous variation in political power for a given firm-politician tie, 
my results are less susceptible to endogeneity concerns prevalent in empirical studies on political 
connection.
7
 My finding that firms with geographical ties to politicians are more likely to smooth 
earnings adds to the literature on the effect of political connection on accounting choices.
8
 My 
results propose an additional motivation that may influence a firm's accounting choice and 
suggest the need to consider firms' incentives to correctly interpret the information in earnings.      
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides institutional 
background of the research setting and develops my hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the empirical 
framework, including sample identification, variable measurement and research design. Empirical 
results are presented in section 4, and section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Background and Hypotheses Development  
2.1 Political power through promotion to chairmanship of Senate committees  
The seniority system is used to allocate leadership positions in congressional committees 
in the U.S. (Roberts 1990). The member with the longest committee tenure from the controlling 
                                                 
7
 Political connection measures used in the prior literature include the presence of former politicians as top 
officers or board members (Faccio 2006; Houston et al. 2014), political contributions to politicians’ 
(re)election campaigns (Cooper et al. 2010; Duchin and Sosyura 2012), and lobbying (Duchin and Sosyura 
2012; Hill et al. 2013). Since firms strategically develop their political ties, endogeneity is a concern for 
these measures of political connection. 
 
8
 Two studies are notable from this literature. Chaney et al. (2011) use international data to provide 
evidence that politically connected firms have lower earnings quality. However, the implication of their 
results to U.S. firms is limited since their result is mainly driven by Japanese firms in the sample. Ramanna 
and Roychowdhury (2010) show that large political donor firms with outsourcing activities tend to have 
negative discretionary accruals around the 2004 election. 
 
   
7 
(non-controlling) party is promoted to be a chairman (ranking member) when the existing 
chairman (ranking member) vacates his seat. A chairman (ranking member) can leave because 
he/she is defeated in the election, resigns, or dies or the controlling party changes after the 
election.
9
 The inherent unpredictability of these events, except for a few anticipated election 
outcomes, makes this transition of chairmanship an exogenous event.
10
 
A natural question arises following the promotion to chairman: Does committee 
leadership provide additional power to the senator beyond his/her committee membership? 
Roberts (1990) provides compelling evidence in the affirmative. Using stock market reaction to 
the death of Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson, ranking member on the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, in September 1983, he demonstrates that committee leadership endows opportunities 
to foster constituent interests. Stock prices of companies in the Senator’s home state of 
Washington reacted negatively to the news, whereas the stock prices of firms based in Georgia, 
the state of Jackson’s successor on the committee, Sam Nunn, increased.  
There are two channels through which benefits to the home state can arise from the 
power of committee chairmanship. First, committee chairmanship can bring distributive benefits 
to the home state. USA Today, for example, pointed out that Senator Sam Brownback of Kansas 
inserted $12.5 million of earmarks for his state in the bill after he was promoted to the 
chairmanship of the Agriculture Committee (Kelley 2010). Distributive politics literature has also 
documented that senior members of the Senate obtain a disproportionately high share of federal 
funds for their constituencies (Boyle and Matheson 2009). More recently, Cohen et al. (2011) 
                                                 
9
 There are occasional exceptions to seniority-based leadership allocation. One of them is when a senator is 
already holding a chair position of another committee. The U.S. Senate places restrictions on the number of 
chair positions a senator may hold.  
 
10
 It is difficult to predict a change in the controlling party, which results from the combination of the entire 
election outcome as well as the primaries. For example, previous poll numbers were inaccurate in 
predicting one of the most dramatic upsets in congressional history, the defeat of Eric Cantor, the then 
House majority leader, in the primary in June, 2014. Even for relatively predictable elections, uncertainty 
about the outcome still exists.  
   
8 
documented that appointment as a powerful committee chair results in a significant increase of 
federal money, in the form of procurement contracts, earmark spending, and government transfers, 
flowing into the chairman’s home state.  
The second channel is the chairman’s ability to influence various policies, including his 
authority to control the agenda. The U.S. Senate website (www.senate.gov) emphasizes the 
influence of the chairman in the committee system by stating that “the chair primarily controls a 
committee’s business” and “the indispensable role of committees in the legislative process places 
great power in the hands of their individual chairmen” (Congressional Research Service 1994). 
By setting the legislative agenda, the chair can affect which legislation is brought to vote, how 
much time to spend on each topic, what hearings to hold, or who to call to testify (Gropper et al. 
2013).  
It is well documented both anecdotally as well as in the academic literature that 
companies headquartered in the committee leader's home state can benefit from their senator's 
rise to these powerful positions. Politicians have incentives to advance the interests of local firms, 
and hence, the local economy, to enhance their future electoral chances. It is not uncommon to 
find news articles discovering these cases. The New York Times, for instance, reported that 
Senator Trent Lott, the Republican majority leader, put an amendment to the bill on product 
liability standard to protect his home state company (Lewis 1998). Indicating the close relation 
between the Senator and the local company, Henry “Scoop” Jackson, the Senator in Roberts 
(1990) study, was famously labeled the "Senator from Boeing" (Vest 2002). Gropper et al. (2013) 
also provide evidence that commercial banks headquartered in the home state of the chairman of 
the Senate and House banking committees are more profitable.
11
 Overall, empirical and anecdotal 
                                                 
11
 See also Faccio and Parsley (2009) and Kim et al. (2012) who examine the influence of politicians on the 
performance of firms head-quartered in the home state.   
 
   
9 
evidence suggests that the appointment as a powerful committee chair can have a positive effect 
on companies headquartered in the home state through the chair's influence on distributive 
benefits and various policies.
12
  
 
2.2 Role of media and watchdog organizations  
The media can play an important role in influencing government policy including 
regulatory process since it provides a large part of the information people use in their voting 
decisions (e.g., Besley and Burgess 2002; Strömberg 2004; Dyck et al. 2013). Mass media can 
reduce voters' costs of becoming informed by collecting, reviewing, and summarizing facts and, 
thus, help to overcome the rational voter ignorance problem (Dyck et al. 2013). An informed 
electorate is likely to put political pressure on elected officials who may be forced to respond by 
making policy changes. A growing body of literature in economics has documented the effect of 
mass media on policy outcomes, including public spending (Strömberg 2004), foreign aid 
(Eisensee and Strömberg 2007), and government accountability (Besley and Burgess 2002).  
The press performs its role not only by originally investigating and analyzing issues but 
also by rebroadcasting information from other intermediaries (Miller 2006). Among various 
information sources, it is the public watchdog organizations that can assist and empower citizens 
as well as the media to monitor and affect government policies by providing organized 
information, research, and insights. These organizations maintain a database of information on 
government contracts, earmarks and money in politics that can be easily accessed by the media 
and the general public and they often publish reports to ignite public awareness. For example, 
                                                 
12
 I acknowledge that companies not headquartered but with significant operations in a state may also reap 
political benefits through Senate chair appointments. Similar to other related studies discussed above, my 
sample does not include such companies because company-specific data on proportionate operations by 
state is not readily available. Moreover, the exclusion of these companies from the treatment sample is 
likely to bias against finding income smoothing effects following a shock to political visibility.        
   
10 
Center for Responsive Politics, a nonprofit group which tracks money in politics, provides a 
comprehensive resource for campaign finances and lobbying data and has been frequently cited in 
the media. Another watchdog group that monitors wasteful government spending, Citizens 
Against Government Waste, sends out periodic publications to the news media to highlight 
spending habits of lawmakers and hold them accountable. The work of Taxpayers For Common 
Sense also illustrates the role of watchdog organizations in legislation: by creating and 
maintaining publicly available databases of earmark spending, it successfully put pressure on 
Congress to require increased disclosure of the earmarking process.
13
  
Media's interest generally focuses on the newsworthiness of topics, those that are out of 
the ordinary, novel, and conflict-filled (Dyck et al. 2013; Miller 2006). Firms’ ties to politicians 
and their preferential treatment are topics with such attributes and have attracted media and public 
attention. For example, Halliburton, with its ties to former U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney, was 
severely criticized for obtaining a major defense contract during the Iraq war (Fifield 2013). More 
recently, Duke Energy is at the center of a political scandal due to accusations of being protected 
from expensive environmental penalties by Governor McCrory of North Carolina, its former 
employee of 28 years (Biesecker 2014). In the academic literature, Ramanna and Roychowdhury 
(2010) also indicate that press coverage on firms’ outsourcing was much higher for political 
donor firms than other firms of similar size in the same industry, consistent with political 
connections attracting greater media interest.  
Increase in earmarks flowing into the home states of chairmen of Senate committees also 
draws media attention and public scrutiny. USA Today, for instance, reported such cases and 
criticized the system of earmarks as being “fundamentally flawed” citing Steve Ellis of Taxpayers 
for Common Sense (Kelley 2010). Government procurement contract policies also suffer 
                                                 
13
 From the highlights of activities of Taxpayers For Common Sense website: 
http://www.taxpayer.net/about/history-accomplishments.  
   
11 
significant weaknesses as identified in the report published by the Government Accountability 
Office (New York Times 2010). These instances provide the basis for the public’s skeptical view 
on distributive politics. For example, the survey results of the Rasmussen report reveal that 66% 
of people believe that most government contracts are given to companies with political 
connections. This negative public view of firms profiting from their political associations, shaped 
by information provided by media and watchdog groups, puts pressure on lawmakers and can 
influence the policy-making process. The ban on earmarks in 2010, for instance, is one example 
of the consequences of such pressure as acknowledged in a statement by House Republican 
Leader, John Boehner (The Wall Street Journal 2010). 
 
2.3 Hypotheses development  
In their exposition of the positive accounting theory, Watts and Zimmerman (1978) 
proposed political considerations as one of the factors that determine managers’ accounting 
choices. The political cost hypothesis predicts that, to the extent a firm is subject to potential 
wealth transfers in the regulatory process, its managers have incentives to make accounting 
choices to reduce the likelihood of adverse political actions and their expected costs. Politically 
visible firms are more likely to attract public scrutiny when they report large profits. Their 
sizeable income can be viewed as benefits accruing from their political ties and can exacerbate 
public criticism. As a result, managers of these firms have incentives to use accounting discretion 
to avoid reporting large profits, thereby reducing expected political costs.  
Prior studies testing the political cost hypothesis usually examine whether politically 
sensitive firms manage earnings downward through discretionary accruals to avoid political costs 
in specific settings where there is heightened regulatory scrutiny. For example, Cahan (1992) 
analyzes accrual choices of 48 firms under anti-trust investigation, while Key (1997) and Han and 
   
12 
Wang (1998) look into the cable television and oil industry respectively during periods of 
heightened scrutiny. More recently, Grace and Leverty (2010) find that insurance companies 
over-estimate their loss reserves in the presence of stringent rate regulation, consistent with the 
hypothesis that managers use accounting discretion to reduce the political costs associated with 
rate regulation. Similarly, Ramanna and Roychowdhury (2010) document that politically-
connected firms with more outsourcing activities use income-decreasing discretionary accruals to 
reduce the cost associated with political scrutiny around the 2004 Congressional elections. 
Overall, prior studies provide supporting evidence that firms make financial reporting choices to 
minimize expected political costs. However, as these studies are based on a small set of industry-
specific firms, there is limited evidence in support of the political cost hypothesis using a more 
comprehensive sample. Moreover, as pointed out by Watts and Zimmerman (1990), regulatory 
actions are endogenous events and underlying economic conditions may drive both the 
heightened scrutiny and the incentives to choose particular accounting choices in some settings.   
A senator’s rise to the influential position of a committee chair provides an exogenous 
setting to test the political cost hypothesis using a broader sample of firms. Firms geographically 
connected to the promoted chairman likely gain political capital and benefit from the increased 
power of the politician through various channels. Meanwhile, these politically connected firms 
and the promoted politicians are exposed to greater public scrutiny. While already under the 
public radar, these firms are more likely to draw media attention when they report large profits 
(Watts and Zimmerman 1978).
14
 Negative public opinion fueled by the revelation of large profits 
can trigger political backlash. Hall (1993) argues that “the extent of any political backlash 
                                                 
14
 There is empirical evidence supporting this argument. For example, Bamber (1986) and Engelberg and 
Parsons (2011) demonstrate that greater unexpected earnings trigger higher trading volume, which is an 
indirect measure of investor attention. In addition, Solomon and Soltes (2012) provide direct evidence that 
earnings surprises spark more press coverage.  
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depends in part on the size of the reported profits.” Consequently, I expect that firms are more 
likely to mask the benefits from political connections to avoid negative consequences by 
engaging in income smoothing after the promotion of their home state politician. My first 
hypothesis stated in the alternative form is the following:  
H1: Firms are more likely to engage in income smoothing after their home state senator is 
promoted to the chairmanship of a powerful Senate committee. 
My hypothesis considers promotions to a powerful position in the Senate but not such 
promotions in the House. Senate committees are considered to be more influential than House 
committees in disbursing federal funds. For example, the average earmarks obtained by Senate 
Committees are two to three times larger in magnitude than those obtained by House Committees 
(Center for Responsive Politics).
15
 Senators also receive higher amounts of political contributions 
than House Representatives on average (Grier and Munger 1993). Promotions to Senate 
committees therefore constitute a powerful setting for testing the political costs hypothesis 
relative to promotions to House committees.
16
 
I focus on firms' income smoothing behavior because the benefits accruing from Senate 
committee chairmanship are likely to occur over a long time horizon. In my sample, the average 
tenure of a Senate committee chair is 7.6 years. The multi-period nature of this setting makes 
income smoothing a natural medium to disguise firms' true performance over a prolonged period; 
the use of one-shot income-decreasing accounting choices will not be as effective since their 
effect is likely to reverse in subsequent periods.
17
 Income smoothing is defined as an attempt by 
                                                 
15
 http://www.opensecrets.org/cmteprofiles/earmarks.php 
 
 
16
 Consistent with this argument, I do not find a significant increase in home-state firms' ROA after the 
promotion of a congressman as a House committee chair. 
 
17
 Dou, Hope, and Thomas (2013) likewise investigate income smoothing behavior due to the multi-period 
nature of supplier-customer relationships. 
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managers to reduce fluctuations in firms’ publicly reported net income (Beidleman 1973), which 
includes both inflating reported net income when it is low and reducing reported income when it 
is too high. In years with large profits, firms may use income-decreasing techniques to dampen 
their reported profitability, e.g., by creating secret reserves such as overestimating a liability. On 
the other hand, in years with low profits or losses, firms may use income-increasing techniques to 
report a stable level of profitability, e.g., by withdrawing from secret reserves.  In addition, firms 
may use income-increasing techniques in years of low profits or losses to avoid jeopardizing the 
grant of government contracts and/or to avoid political backlash by reporting poor performance 
having obtained government contracts through their political connections.
18
  
Firms’ incentives to smooth earnings are likely to increase with the level of expected 
political costs. In cross-sectional analyses, I first test this prediction using the variation in 
expected political costs resulting from firms' government contract intensity. This is consistent 
with Mills et al. (2013) who show that firms with larger government contracts and greater 
reliance on government contracts pay more taxes in order to deflect scrutiny that could lead to 
negative government reactions.  
H2: The increase in income smoothing after the promotion of a home-state senator is more 
pronounced for firms with higher government contract intensity. 
Second, I examine whether the increase in firms’ tendency to smooth earnings is more 
pronounced when the promoted politician is relatively junior. It has been well documented that 
senior politicians are more powerful than juniors (e.g., Roberts 1990). When a senior senator 
becomes a new chairman of the committee, the incremental power and benefits from the 
chairmanship can be marginal. In contrast, a junior senator who is promoted to the leadership 
position likely experiences a more substantial increase in political power. Accordingly, the 
                                                 
18
 Moreover, firms may not be able to use income-decreasing techniques in years with low profits or losses 
because it may not be possible to sustain the creation of secret reserves in many consecutive years.             
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increase in political capital and thus public scrutiny is more pronounced for firms that are 
geographically connected to a relatively junior promoted senator. I therefore expect that the 
increase in incentives to smooth earnings is more pronounced for firms in the home state of the 
promoted chairman with relatively lower seniority. 
H3: The increase in income smoothing after the promotion of a home-state senator is more 
pronounced for firms in the home state of a relatively junior senator. 
Third, I investigate whether home-state firms who provide contributions to the promoted 
chairman’s political campaign have stronger incentives to smooth earnings. Consistent with 
Ramanna and Roychowdhury (2010), corporate contributors have stronger ties to their senators 
compared to the average home-state firm and are therefore likely to draw higher political scrutiny 
leading to higher exposure to political costs. Thus, I expect that the increase in incentives to 
smooth income following the promotion will be more pronounced for political donor firms 
headquartered in the home state of the promoted chairman.  
H4: The increase in income smoothing after the promotion of a home-state senator is more 
pronounced for firms who provide contributions to the promoted chair’s political campaign. 
 
3. Research Design, Sample Selection, and Descriptive Statistics  
3.1  Benefits from political connections   
 I examine the effect of an increase in political capital on a home-state firm's sales to the 
government and profitability. Specifically, I estimate the following equations: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛼𝑡 +  𝛽𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡 + γ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  (1) 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛼𝑡 +   𝛽𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡 + γ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡         (2) 
where i indexes firms, j indexes the state of firms’ headquarters, t indexes year, and 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛼𝑡 
represent firm and year fixed effects. I follow Tahoun (2014) and use LogSalesGov, the logarithm 
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of one plus total sales to the U.S. government, as the dependent variable in equation (1). In 
equation (2), I use ROA, return on assets, as a measure of firm profitability following Amore and 
Bennedsen (2013).  
Equations (1) and (2) represent a difference-in-difference approach by including firm and 
year fixed effects, as explained by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and Armstrong et al. 
(2012).
19
 This regression methodology accounts for the fact that promotion shocks are scattered 
over time across different states and also allows for control variables to vary at the firm-year level. 
The regressions are estimated using home-state firms that experience a promotion shock in a 
given year, along with control firms in states that did not experience a promotion shock in that 
year.  
Following Cohen et al. (2011), I set 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡 to be one in the year the senator 
of a given state is promoted to be the chairman of an influential Senate committee and in the 
following six years. Given that the average tenure of the committee chairmanship is 7.6 years, I 
assume that the effects of promotion shocks persist for seven years.20 As in Cohen et al. (2011), I 
examine promotions in up to ten most powerful Senate committees: Finance, Veterans Affairs, 
Appropriations, Rules, Armed Services, Foreign Relations, Intelligence, Judiciary, Budget, and 
Commerce in the order named (Edwards and Stewart III 2006). Different promotion shock 
variables are constructed based on promotions in top 3, top 5, and top 10 committees respectively. 
For example, Promote_Top3ChairOnly is equal to one if the senator of a given state is newly 
appointed as the chairman of one of top three committees, Senate Finance, Veterans Affairs, and 
Appropriations Committees. I also employ an alternative definition of promotion shocks which 
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 Armstrong et al. (2012) provides a detailed discussion of how β captures the causal effect using the 
passage of antitakeover law as an example.  
 
20
 Cohen et al. (2011) assume that the effects of promotion shocks persist for six years in their main 
analysis. As a robustness check, I use alternative windows, assuming the promotion effects last for five, six, 
or eight years. The results are qualitatively similar.   
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include elevation to either the chair or the ranking minority member – the most senior committee 
member from the non-controlling party. Accordingly, Promote_Top3Chair_Rank, for instance, is 
set to one if the senator of a given state is newly promoted to either a chairman or a ranking 
minority member of the top three Senate Committees. 𝛽 captures the causal effect of promotion 
shocks on firms' sales to the government and profitability. To the extent that home state firms 
benefit from their senator’s promotion, I expect 𝛽 to be positive in both equations.  
In equation (1), I control for other determinants of government contracts documented in 
Goldman et al. (2013) and Tahoun (2014). Specifically, these variables include firm size 
(LNSIZE), book-to-market ratio (BM), Herfindahl index (HF), capital expenditure (CAPX) scaled 
by sales, and ROA. In equation (2) with ROA as the dependent variable, I include the lagged value 
of book-to-market ratio (BMt-1) and the lagged value of log assets (LNASSETSt-1) as control 
variables (Amore and Bennedsen 2013). The Appendix provides detailed definitions of all 
variables used in this study. 
 
3.2  Test of income smoothing  
 To test my main hypothesis that home-state firms are more likely to engage in income 
smoothing following their senator’s promotion, I use a difference-in-difference specification 
similar to equations (1) and (2) and employ income smoothing measures as the dependent 
variable. Specifically, I estimate the following regression: 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑆𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛼𝑡 + β 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝑆 + γ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡     (3) 
where i indexes firms, j indexes the state of firms’ headquarters, t indexes year, and 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛼𝑡 
represent firm and year fixed effects. If home-state firms have a greater incentive to smooth 
earnings following their senator’s promotion, I expect β to be positive. 
I use three measures of Income Smoothing. One, IS1, is the ratio of the standard deviation 
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of income before extraordinary items to the standard deviation of cash flows from operations, 
multiplied by -1 (Lang et al. 2012). This measure is constructed based on the argument that if 
firms use accruals to manage earnings, reported earnings will be smoother relative to cash flows 
(e.g., Leuz et al. 2003; Lang et al. 2006). Two, IS2, is the contemporaneous correlation between 
the change in total accruals and the change in cash flow from operations, multiplied by -1 (Leuz 
et al. 2003; Burgstahler et al. 2006). In good times, with high operating cash flows, managers can 
manipulate earnings by understating accruals and creating reserves for the future. These reserves 
will then be reversed to boost earnings in bad times when operating cash flows are low. Thus, 
accruals and cash flows will be more negatively correlated when managers engage in earnings 
smoothing. Both IS1 and IS2 are calculated using the current year’s and past four years’ 
observations. As in Tucker and Zarowin (2006) and Lang et al. (2012), I choose rolling windows 
of five years. Three, my main income smoothing measure, IS, is the average of the reversed 
fractional rankings of IS1 and IS2, where fractional ranking equals the raw rank divided by the 
number of observations. Higher values of the three measures represent more income smoothing.  
Income smoothing measures computed using rolling windows of five years are 
contaminated for the promotion year and the three years right after the promotion. For example, 
for the year after the promotion (event year +1), the income smoothing measures are computed 
over the period from three years before the promotion to one year after the promotion (i.e., from 
event years -3 to +1). Three years out of the five-year window come from the pre-promotion 
period and the resulting income smoothing measures may not pick up changes in financial 
reporting. To avoid the contamination while not losing too many observations, I drop 
observations in the promotion year and in the first two years after the promotion (i.e., event years 
0 to +2). Similarly, for the post-event years +7 and +8, the calculation of income smoothing  
measures over a five-year window includes some observations from event years (i.e., +3 to +6), 
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thus contaminating the post-event level of income smoothing. Consequently, I also drop event 
years +7 and +8 to increase the power of the tests. Thus, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝑆 , equals one for years 
+3 to +6 relative to the promotion year. 
Following the prior literature (e.g., Dou et al. 2013; Lang et al. 2012), I control for factors 
that affect smoothness of earnings such as profitability, growth options, differences in financing 
choices, and volatility in the operating environment. Specifically, I include firm size 
(LNASSETS), leverage (LEV), book-to-market ratio (BM), operating volatility (STD_SALES), 
proportion of loss years (PCTLOSS), sales growth (SG), capital intensity (OPLEV), cash flows 
from operations (AVGCFO), firm age (AGE), and standard deviation of stock returns (STD_RET) 
as control variables. 
    
3.3  Sample selection  
I use Senate committee data from Nelson (2005) and Stewart and Woon (2011) to 
identify the instances of promotion to a powerful committee chair.
21
 I obtain financial data from 
Compustat, stock return data from CRSP, and data on firms’ sales to the U.S. government from 
the Compustat Segment Files.
22
 Since Compustat data is available from 1967 and I require five 
years of data to compute income smoothing measures, my sample starts in 1971 and ends in 2012.   
 To construct a more powerful test, I focus on firms that are most likely to receive 
political benefits and thus attract public attention after the promotion of their home state senator. 
Considering the committee chair’s influence on the distribution of federal funds, I identify firms 
that are likely to face increased political costs as firms in industries with significant sales to the 
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 Congressional committee data is available as early as 1947 and I thank Charles Stewart III for providing 
this data on his web page http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html#0. 
 
22
 Since Compustat Segment Files are available from 1976, analysis requiring sales to the government data 
are based on the sample firms from 1976 to 2012. 
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U.S. government.
23
 I focus on industry-level rather than firm-level identification because tax 
structure, political pressure, and regulatory policy often vary at the industry level (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1978).
24
 This approach also allows me to include firms that do not have the 
government as a major customer prior to the promotion shock but have the potential to obtain 
more government contracts after an increase in political capital. To the extent that procurement 
contracts increase firm profitability (e.g., Lichtenberg 1992; McGowan and Vendrzyk 2002), the 
value of political ties will be higher for firms in industries more dependent on government 
contracts (e.g. Houston et al. 2014). Firms in these industries are also more politically visible and 
bear higher political costs from government disfavor (Karpoff et al. 1999; Mills et al. 2013). 
Using the information from the Federal Procurement Report, I only include U.S. firms in 
industries with higher than 3% of total sales to the U.S. government as my main sample.
25
 I 
exclude firms in the financial industry (SIC 6000- 6799) due to the uniqueness of their accounting 
practices. To be included in the sample, I require observations to have all the information for 
computing the control variables. My final sample consists of 2,012 firms and 16,494 firm-years 
from 1971 to 2012. Table 1, Panel A, describes the sample industry composition based on the 
two-digit SIC code. My sample has a greater concentration of firms in the electronics, instruments 
and business service industries (including computer, data processing and security systems 
services) relative to the Compustat population.  
I link each of the newly promoted politicians to firms headquartered in his state using the 
location information on Compustat. As prior studies note (e.g., Kim et al. 2012; Heider and 
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 Cohen et al. (2011) document that public funds crowd out private investment and thus reduce firm sales 
growth. However, the authors show that firms with existing government contracts who are likely to gain 
from increased federal spending do not downsize after an infusion of public funds.   
 
24
 Consistent with this, earlier studies testing the political cost hypothesis focus on specific industries such 
as oil refining (Hall 1993), cable television (Key 1997), and insurance (Grace and Leverty 2010).  
 
25
 The Federal Procurement Report is provided by the U.S. General Services Administration’s Federal 
Procurement Data System. https://www.fpds.gov/fpdsng_cms/index.php/en/reports.html.  
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Ljungqvist 2013), Compustat provides only the most recent address information rather than the 
historical location of firms. Therefore, I use address information extracted from each year's 10-K 
filings for a firm from the SEC’s EDGAR database to obtain historical location information.26 
Since electronic filing data is only available after 1994 (required after 1996), I use the earliest 
available address information from 10-K filings for my sample firm-years prior to 1994.  
 
3.4 Descriptive statistics 
 Table 1, Panel B, reports summary statistics for the main variables I use in this study. My 
sample includes 73 newly promoted chairmen from 43 different states for 10 different Senate 
committees in the sample period from 1971 to 2012. When promotions to a ranking minority 
member as well as a chairman position for the top 10 committees are considered, my sample 
includes 103 cases. Firm-year observations based on firms headquartered in states represented by 
a senator promoted to a chairman (or a ranking minority member) of the top 3, 5, and 10 powerful 
committees are 5.8%, 11%, and 20.8% (9.5%, 15.4%, and 29.5%) of the total sample.  
Panel C reports summary statistics of firm characteristics of my sample and the 
Compustat universe. On average, my sample firms have $46 million sales (8.5% of total sales) 
made to the government.27 The median total assets (ASSETS) equal $172 million and median 
return on assets (ROA) is 5.3% for the sample firms. The sample includes relatively larger and 
more profitable firms relative to all Compustat firms, consistent with higher profitability reported 
by large firms with major government contracts (Lichtenberg 1992; McGowan and Vendrzyk 
2002). The sample firms are older and have relatively stable operations as indicated by the 
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 I thank Bill McDonald for providing the 10-K header filing data on his website.  
  
27
 These government sales are conservative estimates since the Compustat Segment file reports data for 
major customers only. 
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volatility of earnings and returns compared to the Compustat population.28  
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 The impact of promotion shocks on firms’ sales to the government and ROA 
 An important maintained hypothesis for the increased political costs following the 
ascension to the chair of a powerful committee is that the new chair with increased power 
provides benefits to his constituencies including the firms headquartered in his/her state. Hence, 
before testing the main hypothesis of income smoothing, I investigate whether sample firms in 
the home state of the new chair (or the ranking minority member) in fact benefit from their 
senator’s increased power. First, I look into the impact of promotion shocks on firms' sales to the 
government. As Cohen et al. (2011) show in their state-level analysis, the channels of distributive 
politics include earmarks, government transfers, as well as government contracts. However, data 
on earmarks and government transfers are only available at the state-level. Thus, I examine firm-
level benefits in the form of sales to the government made by home-state firms using data 
obtained from the Compustat Segment file. One limitation of using this data is that it only 
provides sales information when the government is a major customer of the firm. Consequently, 
the impact of promotion shocks on firms who do not have the government as a major customer is 
not captured in this analysis so that the estimated effect on benefits will be conservative. I also 
examine the overall effect of promotion shocks on treatment firms’ operating performance 
captured by return on assets (ROA). This summary measure will likely reflect not only 
distributive benefits but also other advantages received by treatment firms through the promoted 
senator's influence on various policies.    
                                                 
28
 The differences in means and medians of my sample relative to the Compustat population (excluding my 
sample) are significant at the 1% level for all variables except for an insignificant median difference for the 
average CFO variable. 
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 The estimation results reported in Table 2 are consistent with the argument that the new 
leadership of powerful Senate committees has a positive effect on the performance of home-state 
firms. Panel A presents the estimation results of equation (1) using the logarithm of one plus 
aggregate sales to the government (LogSalesGov) as the dependent variable (consistent with 
Tahoun 2014). I only include firm-year observations reporting the U.S. government as a major 
customer for this analysis. The results show that firms experience a significant increase in sales to 
the government following the promotion of their home-state senator to the chairman of the top 3 
or 5 Senate committees. Including promotions to the ranking minority member as a promotion 
shock along with promotions to the chairman position also gives similar results. Alternatively, I 
also run a tobit regression with all firm-years, including firm-years without the U.S. government 
as a major customer, and find a similar positive impact of promotion shocks (untabulated). 
Panel B presents the estimation results of equation (2) using ROA as the dependent 
variable. The results indicate that promotion shocks give rise to an increase in profitability of 
home-state firms. New chairmanship of powerful committees results in a significant increase in 
the ROA of home-state firms over the subsequent seven years in the range of 0.4% to 0.6% per 
year. Given the average ROA of 4.2% for the sample, the impact represents an economically 
significant increase of 10% to 14%. Note that, to the extent  treatment firms are more likely to 
utilize their accounting discretion to conceal high profits as predicted by H1, their reported ROA 
will be lower than the "unmanaged" ROA, so that the observed effect of the promotion shock on 
the increase in ROA (i.e., 10%-14%) will be understated. As I broaden the definition of 
promotion shocks by adding promotions of ranking minority members, the effects become 
insignificant. This is consistent with results on earmarks in Cohen et al. (2011) who show that 
ranking members are less influential than chairs of the same committee. Overall, the empirical 
findings suggest that new leadership of powerful Senate committees provides significant benefits 
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to firms in the senator's home state.  
 
4.2 Stock returns around promotions  
While I document an increase in sales to the government and ROA of the home-state 
firms, it is likely that home-state firms receive a wide range of other political benefits which are 
difficult to identify due to the lack of available information. Following the prior literature (e.g., 
Fisman 2001; Faccio 2006; Faccio and Parsley 2009), I use stock returns to capture the overall 
value of the political benefits arising from the home-state senator’s promotion.  
First, I use event study methodology to see whether a senator’s promotion has positive 
impact on home-state firms’ stock returns. Although the appointment of the new chairman (or the 
ranking minority member) takes effect on the first day of each Congress session, the upcoming 
change is known when the incumbent dies, resigns, or is defeated in the election. I search and 
identify the exact dates of 41 cases of promotion to chairman or ranking minority member of the 
top 10 Senate committees. Examples of these cases include sudden death of the existing chairman 
or the ranking minority member and the election which causes the change in the chairmanship.29 
Event date is defined as the date of the sudden death or one day after the election date when the 
election outcome is determined. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is calculated by 
summing the difference between the firm’s stock return and the value weighted market return 
over the event window beginning one day prior to the event date on which the promotion is 
determined and ending one and three trading days after the event. 
Table 3, Panel A, reports CARs around the promotions using the event windows (-1, +1), 
and (-1, +3). The table shows that the determination of the promotion results in a statistically 
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 I was unable to identify precise event dates when the incumbent chairman (or the ranking minority 
member) resigns or decides to relinquish a leadership position in one committee to chair a different 
committee.   
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significant increase in stock price of the home-state firms in my sample. The average abnormal 
returns are 0.64% in the (-1, +1) event window and 0.83% in the (-1, +3) event window.30 The 
positive stock price reaction suggests that the stock market perceives that home-state firms 
receive benefits from their home-state senator’s promotion to powerful Senate committees. 
Next, I analyze the long term stock price performance of home-state firms following the 
appointment of the new chairman (or the ranking minority member). Since there are many cases 
of promotions for which I cannot identify the exact event dates, the short-window analysis in 
Panel A is based on a limited number of observations. By using one-year stock returns from the 
first day of each Congress after the new leader takes control of the committee, I am able to 
include all promotion cases in this analysis. I regress log returns on the indicator variable for the 
promotion shock year. Specifically, I define 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑌𝑟_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡  to be one in the year the 
senator of a given state is promoted to be the chairman (or the ranking minority member) of an 
influential Senate committee and zero otherwise. Firm and year fixed effects are included and I 
control for firm size (LNASSET), financial leverage (LEV), stock return volatility (STD_RET), 
ROA, and capital intensity (CAPITAL_INTENSITY) following Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee 
(2006).  
The estimation results of long-window stock returns following the promotion are reported 
in Panel B of Table 3. All the coefficient estimates on the promotion shock year variable are 
positive and three of them are significant. This suggests that a senator’s promotion to the 
committee chair (or the ranking minority member) has a significantly positive effect on the one-
year stock returns for the home-state firms in my sample. The results are similar when I use the 
returns over two years following the promotion (untabulated). Overall, the positive long-window 
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 This increase is comparable to the three-day abnormal returns of -0.6% suffered by firms upon the 
sudden death of politicians from the same city, documented in Faccio and Parsley (2009). 
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return performance provides corroborative evidence that new leadership of powerful Senate 
committees provides significant benefits to firms in the senator's home state.   
 
4.3 The impact of promotion shocks on income smoothing  
Having shown that firms benefit from the promotion of their home-state senators, I now 
examine whether these firms engage in income smoothing to dampen their profits following the 
promotion. To test my main hypothesis, I estimate equation (3) using the three income smoothing 
measures discussed in section 3.2.  
 Table 4, Panel A, reports the coefficient estimates (and t-statistics) using the composite 
measure, IS, as the income smoothing proxy. Across all measures of promotion shocks (i.e., Top 
3, 5, and 10 committees, and with or without ranking member), I find that the estimated 
coefficients on promotion shocks are significantly positive. This suggests that treatment firms are 
more likely to engage in income smoothing after the promotion of their home-state senator than 
control firms in other states that are unaffected by the promotion. Panel B and Panel C report the 
results with IS1 and IS2 as alternative measures of income smoothing, respectively. Similar to the 
results in Panel A, the coefficient estimates on promotion shocks remain positive and significant 
for both measures as reported in Panels B and C.31   
 Taken together, the documented increase in income smoothing following the home-state 
senator’s rise to a powerful position is consistent with managers of treatment firms utilizing their 
accounting discretion to avoid public scrutiny and the ensuing negative publicity arising from the 
political benefits they receive. 
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 To select sample industries to test the impact of promotion shocks on income smoothing, I also use 
alternative cut-offs in place of ≥3% government sales. When I employ 1% (5%) cut-off, the sample has 
33,902 (9,191) firm-year observations. Using the 1% cut-off gives substantially similar results, while 
results using the 5% cut-off are slightly weaker due to the smaller sample size (untabulated).     
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4.4 Cross-sectional variation in the effect of promotion shocks on income smoothing 
4.4.1  Effect of promotion shocks and government contract intensity 
Next, I investigate whether the increase in income smoothing following a promotion 
shock is more pronounced for firms with higher government contract intensity. This is because 
firms with high government contract intensity are likely to be more politically visible and hence 
exposed to higher political costs. I follow Mills et al. (2013) to measure a firm’s contract intensity 
(CI) as a product of the relative size of government contracts and the importance of government 
contracts to the firm. The relative size of government contracts is an indicator variable that equals 
one if the level of a firm's government contracts is in the top 10% of the distribution of 
government contracts over the previous three years. The importance of government contracts to 
the firm is measured as the percentage of the firm's sales made to the government averaged over 
the previous three years. The contract intensity measure (CI) recognizes that firms with huge 
procurement contracts are likely to catch public attention and the political costs from such 
negative publicity can vary with the importance of the contracts to the firm (Mills et al. 2013).  
I estimate the following OLS regression by adding contract intensity (CI) and its interaction with 
the promotion shock indicator (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝑆 ∗ 𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) to equation (3).  
𝐼𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛼𝑡 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝑆 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝑆 ∗ 𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 +
γ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡    (4) 
Table 5, Panel A, presents the results of estimating equation (4) using CI as the measure 
of the firm’s contract intensity. I find that, in five out of six specifications, the coefficient 
estimate on the interaction of CI and the promotion shock is significantly positive. This suggests 
that the incentive to smooth earnings following promotion shocks is particularly strong for firms 
with greater exposure to political costs as indicated by the intensity of their dealings with the 
government. These results provide further corroborating evidence of the main hypothesis.  
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4.4.2 Effect of promotion shocks and committee seniority 
 In this section, I examine whether the extent of the increase in political power as captured 
by the seniority of the promoted chairman (or the ranking minority member) influences the 
relation between promotion shocks and incentives to smooth earnings. Committee seniority is the 
number of continuous years the senator has spent on the committee he/she chairs (Nelson 2005; 
Stewart and Woon 2011). In my sample, the average committee seniority of a new chairman on 
the date of appointment is 17 years. Given that senior senators are more powerful than junior 
senators in general, senior senators are likely to convey fewer incremental benefits to their 
constituencies after their promotion relative to junior senators. Consequently, following the 
promotion shock, firms in the home state of a junior senator will experience greater increase in 
political benefits and thus political costs. I therefore predict that the increase in the incentive to 
smooth earnings following the promotion will be more pronounced in these firms than in firms 
from a state where a senior senator is promoted. I define JUNIOR as one if the committee 
seniority of the promoted chairman (or ranking minority member) is below the median committee 
seniority across all the promoted chairmen (or ranking minority member) of the top 10 Senate 
committees and zero otherwise.
32
 I estimate the following OLS regression by adding an 
interaction variable of promotion shock and the committee seniority indicator 
(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝑆 ∗ 𝐽𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) to equation (3).  
𝐼𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝑆 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝑆 ∗ 𝐽𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + γ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
(5) 
Table 5, Panel B, presents the results of estimating equation (5) using JUNIOR as the 
indicator variable of the chairman’s committee seniority. In five out of the six specifications, the 
coefficient estimate on the interaction of JUNIOR and the promotion shock variable is 
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 Median committee seniority is 17 years.  
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significantly positive. This suggests that the promotion of a junior senator has a stronger impact 
on income smoothing incentives relative to the promotion of an already powerful senior senator. 
The evidence that the extent of change in political capital influences income smoothing incentives 
further strengthens my inference about the relation between political costs and the use of a firm’s 
accounting discretion.  
 
4.4.3 Effect of promotion shocks and political contributions 
In this section, I test whether the increase in income smoothing after the promotion of a 
home-state senator is more pronounced for firms that provide contributions to the promoted 
chairman’s political campaign. Using corporate political contributions data from the U.S. Federal 
Election Commission (FEC) for the period 1989 to 2012, I define PC as one if the firm 
contributed to the political campaign of the promoted chairman over the period from seven years 
before the promotion to seven years after the promotion and zero otherwise. I estimate the 
following OLS regression by adding political contribution indicator variable (PC) and its 
interaction with the promotion shock indicator (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝑆 ∗ 𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) to equation (3).  
𝐼𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛼𝑡 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝑆 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝑆 ∗ 𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 +
   γ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡      (6) 
Table 5, Panel C, presents the results of estimating equation (6) using PC as the indicator 
variable for political contributors. Although the power of this test is reduced with the limited 
sample size and the limited number of firms who contributed to the political campaign of the 
specific promoted chairman or the ranking minority member, I find that the coefficient estimates 
on the interaction of PC and the promotion shock variable are significantly positive in two out of 
six specifications. This suggests that the increase in income smoothing after the promotion is 
more pronounced for political donor firms with stronger ties to the new chairman (or ranking 
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minority member). This evidence is consistent with the idea that corporate contributors, facing 
higher public scrutiny, use accounting discretion to manage the political costs associated with 
negative publicity (Ramanna and Roychowdhury 2010).
33
  
 
4.5 The impact of exit shocks on ROA and income smoothing 
  So far I have focused on the promotion of senators as a source of exogenous increase in 
political power to examine firms’ incentives to smooth earnings. If the ascension to a leadership 
position brings in additional benefits and public scrutiny, these will cease to exist following the 
departure of a committee chair (or a ranking minority member). The relinquishment of 
chairmanship, hence, would discontinue the incentives to smooth earnings. As a natural extension 
of my main analyses, I examine whether the departure of the committee leadership (i.e., an exit 
shock) has a negative impact on firm performance and income smoothing.  
 In my sample, about 3% (6% and 11%) of firm-years are in states whose senator vacates 
a chair position of a top 3 (top 5 and top 10) committee. Panel A of Table 6 presents the results of 
estimating a variation of equation (2) by regressing ROA on exit shocks instead of promotion 
shocks. An exit shock occurs if the senator of a given state, who once was a chairman of an 
influential Senate committee, vacates the leadership position (either chairman or ranking minority 
member). I set the exit shock variable (Exit_TopNChairOnly) as one in the year of the leader’s 
departure and in the subsequent four years, assuming that the effect of the exit shock persists for 
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 Another plausible cross-sectional difference in the effect of promotion shocks could arise when the 
committee of which the senator is a new chair has jurisdiction over specific industries. To test this 
possibility, I use the information on Senate committee jurisdiction from Ovtchinnikov and Pantaleoni 
(2012). Among the top 10 Senate committees included in this study, only Finance, Armed Services, and 
Commerce committees have clear industry jurisdiction. For example, Armed Services committee is likely 
to have greater influence on the defense industry. Other committees such as Appropriations, Judiciary, and 
Rules, do not have industry specific jurisdiction. Since firms in the financial industry are not included in 
my sample, I can only use promotion shocks related to Armed Services and Commerce committees. 
However, the power of the test is too low to proceed with the estimation since the matched observations are 
too few (only five firms) when I link these two committees with firms in the related industries.  
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four years. The coefficient estimates on exit shocks in all specifications are negative and two out 
of three of them are significant, indicating that treatment firms’ operating performance decreased 
following the departure of their connected senator from the leadership position. These coefficient 
estimates, ranging from -0.003 to -0.007, are comparable in magnitude to the positive coefficients 
on the promotion shocks in Panel B of Table 2. This result suggests that the benefits firms receive 
during the tenure of their senator’s chairmanship largely disappear after the exit shock.34  
  Panel B of Table 6 presents the results of estimating equation (3) by regressing the 
income smoothing measure, IS, on exit shocks. Given that I use five-year rolling windows for 
computing the income smoothing measure, I define exit shocks for income smoothing tests 
(Exit_TopNChairOnlyIS) to be one in the years +3 to +5 relative to the year in which the senator 
relinquishes his leadership. I exclude the year of the exit, years +1 and +2, and year +6 in my 
analysis due to the contamination of the income smoothing measure in these years. The remaining 
sample years of firms experiencing the exit shock, along with the firm-years of non-treatment 
firms, constitute the control sample. The coefficient estimates on exit shocks are negative for all 
specifications and two out of three of them are significant. The results suggest that, in response to 
the reduced public scrutiny following their senator’s departure from the position of a Senate 
committee chair, firms are less likely to smooth earnings relative to when their senator is in 
power. In summary, this test provides confirming evidence that changes in the leadership position 
of an influential Senate committee (both promotion and departure) affect the level of political 
benefits and hence home-state firms' incentives to smooth earnings. 
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 I also test whether exit shocks have a negative impact on sales to the government by regressing 
LogSalesGov on exit shocks for the sample of firms with the government as a major customer. Untabulated 
results indicate a negative but insignificant impact of exit shocks on government contracts. Perhaps this 
reflects the long-term nature of government contracts which cannot be easily terminated on the chair's 
departure.      
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4.6 Robustness tests 
4.6.1 Alternative definition of benefit period after promotion shocks  
 I follow Cohen et al. (2011) and measure the effects of promotion shocks over a fixed 
period of time (i.e., seven years following promotion) to ensure the exogeneity of the setting. 
There may be a concern that, examining the effects over a fixed period after all promotion shocks 
rather than over the actual tenure of individual promoted chairs may introduce measurement error 
in estimating the effect of the shock. For example, if a senator continues as chairman for twenty 
years, measuring the effect of promotion shocks over seven years will wrongly classify years 
after the seventh year of the promotion as non-treatment years.  
 To address this issue, I adopt an alternative definition of promotion shocks based on the 
actual tenure of each chair as in Snyder and Welch (2014). Specifically, the historical promotion 
shock is defined as one in the years when the senator of a given state is a chairman (or a ranking 
minority member) of a powerful committee and zero otherwise.35 Results based on this alternative 
definition of the benefit period are substantially similar (even stronger) relative to those reported 
in Table 3 (untabulated).  
 The use of actual leadership tenure to define the benefit period has been criticized by 
Cohen et al. (2014) in response to Snyder and Welch (2014). Cohen et al. (2014) argue that actual 
leadership tenure is endogenous since the continuation of leadership/reappointment depends on 
the re-election results of the senator which might be correlated with his state's economic 
condition. In such a scenario, it is possible that the state’s economy could drive the performance 
of firms as well as their incentives to smooth earnings over the actual tenure of the chairman. Due 
to this ongoing debate in the literature, although my results remain unchanged, I do not use the 
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 I additionally require the chairman to maintain tenure for at least five prior years to calculate the income 
smoothing measure. The same criteria for inclusion or exclusion of firm-years are applied as in the main 
tests discussed in section 3.2.  
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actual tenure of individual chairs to define the benefit period in my main analyses. 
 
4.6.2 The impact of promotion shocks on report readability  
Bloomfield (2002) argues that managers make strategic choices motivated, at least partly, 
by a desire to make it harder for financial statement users to uncover information that managers 
wish to remain undisclosed. The results, thus far, provide evidence that firms smooth earnings to 
mask their true performance. In this section, I examine whether firms try to obfuscate information 
in their annual reports by making them more difficult and complicated to read, in addition to 
engaging in income smoothing. Following Li (2008), I use the Fog index (Fog) as a measure of 
annual report readability.
36
 Similar to equations (1) and (2), Fog is regressed on promotion shocks, 
control variables, and firm and year fixed effects. I control for other potential determinants of 
readability used in the literature, namely book to market ratio (BM), firm size (LNASSETS), 
earnings volatility (VOLROE), return volatility (STD_RET), firm age (AGE), and special items 
scaled by total assets (SI).  
Panel A Table 7 presents the results of this analysis using the sample firm-years from 
1993 to 2012 when the Fog index is available. The coefficient estimates on promotion shocks are 
mostly positive but significant in one of the specifications, indicating that the impact of 
promotion shocks on report readability is marginal for the entire sample firm-years from 1993 to 
2012. Therefore, I increase the power of my test by focusing on firms with the strongest 
incentives to obfuscate information - firms with higher political visibility as indicated by their 
government contract intensity. Panel B presents the results using the sample firm-years with 
higher government contract intensity from 1993 to 2012. The coefficient estimates on promotion 
shocks are significantly positive in four out of six specifications, indicating that, for the sample of 
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 I thank Feng Li for providing the Fog index data on his web page.  
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firms with greater contract intensity, annual reports become more complicated to read after the 
home state senator’s promotion to a powerful Senate committee.37 This result suggests that firms 
receiving political benefits attempt to obfuscate information to avoid political costs in addition to 
engaging in income smoothing. 
 
4.6.3 Other robustness tests  
I conduct a variety of additional robustness tests. Cohen et al. (2011) document the effect 
of increased federal spending on corporate retrenchment, arguing that public expenditures crowd 
out private investments. A possible alternative explanation of my findings is that the effect of 
promotion shocks on income smoothing is a manifestation of their negative impact on firm 
investment. However, in untabulated results, I find that promotion shocks do not have a negative 
impact on capital expenditure, R&D, payout ratio, employment level, or sales growth for the 
sample of firms in government-dependent industries that I examine in this study. This is 
consistent with the discussion in Cohen et al. (2011) that firms with valuable procurement 
contracts do not downsize following the increase in public spending. Nevertheless, I repeat my 
main analyses by adding capital expenditure (CapExp), R&D expenditure (RD), payout ratio 
(Payout), and the change in the number of employees (EmployChange) as control variables. My 
results are substantially similar suggesting that the evidence in this paper cannot be explained by 
the effects of reduced investment documented by Cohen et al. (2011).  
Another potential alternative explanation for my results is that the observed increase in 
income smoothing might be due to the changed nature of the firms’ business after their home state 
senator’s ascension to a committee chair. As shown in Panel A of Table 2, home state firms 
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 I also examine the log of file size of the 10K report for these firms as an alternative measure of 
readability of annual reports. The results are in general weaker, with the coefficient estimate being 
significantly positive in two specifications. 
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receive more government contracts after the promotion. If having the government as a major 
customer provides more stable source of income compared to having a private customer, then 
increased government contracts, rather than manager’s intentional actions, may generate smooth 
earnings after the promotion. To rule out this alternative explanation, I include sales to the 
government (LogSaleGov) as an additional control variable in equation (3). The results are robust 
to the inclusion of this variable (untabulated).  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines whether firms receiving benefits through their connections to 
politicians smooth earnings to reduce public scrutiny. I use exogenous changes in Senate 
committee leadership to identify changes in political costs to firms headquartered in the 
constituency of the promoted chairman. Using a difference-in-difference research design, I find 
that home-state firms are more likely to smooth earnings after their senator’s promotion to a 
committee chair, consistent with the political cost hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman 1978). 
Cross-sectional analyses show that these effects are stronger for politically sensitive firms that are 
exposed to higher political costs, including firms with higher government contract intensity and 
firms who provide contributions to the promoted chair’s political campaign. The increase in the 
tendency to smooth earnings is more pronounced for firms in the constituency of relatively junior 
chairmen, consistent with the idea that junior senators are likely to obtain higher incremental 
power from the promotion. Lastly, I supplement the analysis by providing evidence that, 
following the leadership change, politically sensitive firms have annual reports that are more 
difficult to read as measured by the Fog index, suggesting that besides engaging in income 
smoothing, these firms may attempt to obfuscate information to avoid political costs. 
 To summarize, this paper provides evidence of the political cost hypothesis using a 
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natural experiment with exogenous political shocks that are scattered over time and states. My 
results show that firms respond to the increase in political costs by using their accounting 
discretion to conceal their profits. The inferences apply to a comprehensive sample of firms in 
various industries and hence are more generalizable relative to some prior studies that focus on 
industry-specific, small-sample, and short horizon effects. Overall, my results highlight the role 
of political pressure in determining firms’ discretionary accounting choices and shaping the 
information environment.  
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Table 1: Sample Composition and Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents the sample distribution across industries and descriptive statistics of the sample. The 
sample consists of 16,494 observations in non-financial industries with at least 3% of total sales to the U.S. 
government between 1971 and 2012. Panel A presents the frequency distribution of sample firms by the 2-
digit SIC code along with the Compustat universe (in the last column). Panel B presents the descriptive 
statistics of main variables used in the tests. Panel C presents the comparison of sample firm characteristics 
with the Compustat universe (excluding the financial industry). All continuous variables are winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles. The data on sales to the government are available from 1976 to 2012 and the 
Fog data are available from 1993 to 2012. Detailed variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
 
 Panel A: Sample composition by industry  
 
    # of firms # of firm-years 
   Two-digit SIC code Count Sample (%) Count 
Sample 
(%)  
Compustat 
16 Heavy Construction 23 1.14% 286 1.73% 0.27% 
25 Furniture and Fixtures 35 1.74% 212 1.29% 0.58% 
31 
Leather and Leather 
Products 
18 0.89% 183 1.11% 0.3% 
34 Fabricated Metals 159 7.9% 2,094 12.7% 1.64% 
36 Electronics 244 12.13% 1,891 11.46% 6.48% 
37 Transportation Equipment 169 8.4% 2,005 12.16% 2.03% 
38 Instruments 332 16.5% 2,632 15.96% 5.1% 
39 Misc. Manufacturing 71 3.53% 593 3.6% 0.98% 
44 Water Transportation 18 0.89% 205 1.24% 0.45% 
51 Wholesale Durables 40 1.99% 188 1.14% 1.37% 
73 Business Services 368 18.29% 2,769 16.79% 8.46% 
80 Health Services 124 6.16% 743 4.5% 1.41% 
82 Educational Services 30 1.49% 226 1.37% 0.3% 
87 Engineering Services 140 6.96% 1,178 7.14% 1.5% 
 Others 241 11.99% 1,289 7.81% 69.13% 
Total  2,012 100% 16,494 100% 100% 
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Panel B: Descriptive statistics of main variables 
 
Variables N Mean Median Std.Dev. 
Income Smoothing      
IS (composite) 16,494 0.510 0.514 0.266 
IS1 16,494 -0.692 -0.556 0.527 
IS2 16,494 0.775 0.927 0.352 
Promotion_Shock     
Promote_Top3ChairOnly 16,494 0.058 0 0.233 
Promote_Top3Chair_Rank 16,494 0.095 0 0.293 
Promote_Top5ChairOnly 16,494 0.110 0 0.313 
Promote_Top5Chair_Rank 16,494 0.154 0 0.361 
Promote_Top10ChairOnly 16,494 0.208 0 0.406 
Promote_Top10Chair_Rank 16,494 0.295 0 0.456 
 
Panel C: Comparison of sample firm characteristics with Compustat 
 
 Sample Firms Compustat 
Variables N Mean Median Std.Dev. Mean Median 
ROA 16,494 0.042 0.053 0.107 -0.005 0.042 
SalesGov ($m) 15,016 46.399 0 137.796 12.115 0 
Contract Intensity 14,178 0.082 0 0.191 0.027 0 
Fog 5,085 19.575 19.481 1.671 19.497 19.386 
BM 16,494 0.827 0.829 0.305 0.778 0.779 
ASSETS ($m) 16,494 979.746 171.719 2,814.76 1,182.046 132.815 
MVE ($m) 16,494 1,088.568 124.688 5,939.413 1,461.911 104.284 
Herfindahl_Index 16,494 0.106 0.075 0.100 0.083 0.056 
CAPX/Sales 16,491 0.051 0.034 0.075 0.123 0.044 
LEV 16,494 0.168 0.141 0.158 0.211 0.174 
STD_SALES 16,494 165.967 35.657 430.937 185.854 33.201 
PCTLOSS 16,494 0.183 0.000 0.255 0.242 0.000 
SalesGrowth(SG) 16,494 0.118 0.097 0.170 0.192 0.108 
OPLEV 16,494 0.251 0.230 0.156 0.338 0.274 
AVG(CFO/Assets) 16,494 0.073 0.076 0.081 0.064 0.075 
AGE 16,494 18.187 16 8.844 13.365 11.000 
VOLROE 14,644 2.386 0.108 15.512 3.956 0.135 
STD_RET 16,494 0.123 0.109 0.066 0.138 0.119 
Special Items/Assets 15,925 -0.014 0 0.181 -0.016 0 
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Table 2: The Impact of Promotion Shocks on Firms’ Sales to the Government and ROA  
This table presents OLS regressions of sales to the government and ROA on promotion shocks. Panel A 
reports the results with LogSalesGov as the dependent variable for firms having the government as a major 
customer and Panel B reports results with ROA as the dependent variable. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. All models include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year 
level and t-statistics are included in parentheses below the coefficients. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: The impact of promotion shocks on firms’ sales to the government 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛼𝑡 +  β 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡 + γ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡   (1) 
 
  
 
Dependent Variable: LogSalesGov 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Promote_Top3ChairOnly 0.096**      
 (1.96)      
Promote_Top5ChairOnly  0.120***     
  (3.12)     
Promote_Top10ChairOnly   0.024    
   (0.85)    
Promote_Top3Chair_Rank    0.114***   
    (3.09)   
Promote_Top5Chair_Rank     0.108***  
     (3.49)  
Promote_Top10Chair_Rank      0.024 
      (0.96) 
LNMVE 0.404*** 0.406*** 0.406*** 0.403*** 0.405*** 0.406*** 
 (18.14) (18.19) (18.05) (18.07) (18.14) (18.07) 
BM 0.671*** 0.676*** 0.669*** 0.667*** 0.670*** 0.669*** 
 (8.18) (8.25) (8.13) (8.18) (8.21) (8.14) 
HF -0.164 -0.172 -0.150 -0.161 -0.176 -0.150 
 (-0.73) (-0.77) (-0.66) (-0.72) (-0.78) (-0.66) 
CAPX/Sales -1.313*** -1.309*** -1.317*** -1.305*** -1.305*** -1.314*** 
 (-6.35) (-6.34) (-6.33) (-6.30) (-6.33) (-6.31) 
ROA -0.373** -0.375** -0.371** -0.372** -0.379** -0.373** 
 (-2.31) (-2.32) (-2.29) (-2.30) (-2.36) (-2.31) 
Observations 3,730 3,730 3,730 3,730 3,730 3,730 
R-squared 0.929 0.930 0.929 0.930 0.930 0.929 
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Panel B: The impact of promotion shocks on firms’ ROA 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 +  β 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡 + γ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  (2) 
 
  
 Dependent Variable: ROA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Promote_Top3ChairOnly 0.006**      
 (2.22)      
Promote_Top5ChairOnly  0.005**     
  (2.42)     
Promote_Top10ChairOnly   0.004**    
   (2.24)    
Promote_Top3Chair_Rank    0.001   
    (0.33)   
Promote_Top5Chair_Rank     0.002  
     (0.85)  
Promote_Top10Chair_Rank      -0.000 
      (-0.20) 
BMt-1 -0.129*** -0.129*** -0.129*** -0.129*** -0.129*** -0.129*** 
 (-27.82) (-27.81) (-27.78) (-27.83) (-27.83) (-27.82) 
LNASSETSt-1 -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 (-7.21) (-7.22) (-7.23) (-7.24) (-7.23) (-7.24) 
Observations 16,493 16,493 16,493 16,493 16,493 16,493 
R-squared 0.588 0.588 0.588 0.588 0.588 0.588 
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Table 3: Stock Returns around Promotions 
Panel A: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around promotions  
 
CAR is calculated by summing the difference between the firm’s stock return and the value weighted 
market return over the event window beginning one day prior to the event date on which the promotion is 
determined and ending one and three trading days after the event. Exact event dates include the date of 
sudden death of the existing chairman and the day after the date of the election which results in the change 
in chairmanship. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. *, **, and *** 
represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Event Window 
 
(-1,+1) (-1,+3) 
Mean 0.64%*** 0.83%*** 
p-value 0.009 0.009 
N 315 315 
 
 
 
Panel B: Return performance for the year following the promotion  
 
This panel presents OLS regressions of log returns on the promotion shock variables. LogRet is the 
logarithm of one plus the return over a year following the promotion. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑌𝑟_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡 is one in the 
year the senator of a given state is promoted to be the chairman (or the ranking minority member) of an 
influential Senate committee and zero otherwise. All variables are defined in the Appendix. All models 
include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year level and t-statistics are 
included in parentheses below the coefficients. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 
percentiles. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable: LogRet 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PromoteYr_Top3ChairOnly 0.034      
 (0.77)      
PromoteYr_Top5ChairOnly  0.034     
  (1.24)     
PromoteYr_Top10ChairOnly   0.037**    
   (2.03)    
PromoteYr_Top3Chair_Rank    0.019   
    (0.69)   
PromoteYr_Top5Chair_Rank     0.051**  
     (2.17)  
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PromoteYr_Top10Chair_Rank      0.041** 
      (2.39) 
LNASSETS -0.145*** -0.145*** -0.145*** -0.145*** -0.145*** -0.145*** 
 (-14.68) (-14.69) (-14.69) (-14.69) (-14.67) (-14.67) 
LEV 0.110** 0.111** 0.111** 0.110** 0.109** 0.110** 
 (2.42) (2.42) (2.43) (2.42) (2.40) (2.41) 
STD_RET -0.160 -0.160 -0.159 -0.160 -0.159 -0.157 
 (-1.50) (-1.49) (-1.48) (-1.49) (-1.49) (-1.46) 
ROA -0.140* -0.141* -0.141* -0.140* -0.140* -0.139* 
 (-1.90) (-1.91) (-1.91) (-1.90) (-1.89) (-1.88) 
CAPITAL_INTENSITY 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.121*** 0.122*** 0.121*** 0.122*** 
 (3.77) (3.76) (3.75) (3.78) (3.76) (3.76) 
Constant 1.215*** 1.215*** 1.215*** 1.215*** 1.214*** 1.213*** 
 (16.04) (16.05) (16.06) (16.04) (16.03) (16.03) 
Observations 15,718 15,718 15,718 15,718 15,718 15,718 
R-squared 0.358 0.358 0.358 0.358 0.358 0.358 
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Table 4: The Impact of Promotion Shocks on Income Smoothing  
 
𝐼𝑆_𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛼𝑡 +  β 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝑆 + γ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  (3) 
This table presents OLS regressions of income smoothing measures on promotion shocks. All variables are 
defined in the Appendix. All models include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the 
state-year level and t-statistics are included in parentheses below the coefficients. All continuous variables 
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Using IS as the income smoothing measure 
 
IS is the average of the reversed fractional rankings of two standard measures of income smoothing (IS1 
and IS2). 
 
 Dependent Variable: IS  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Promote_Top3ChairOnly
IS
 0.037***      
 (3.03)      
Promote_Top5ChairOnly
IS
  0.023**     
  (2.20)     
Promote_Top10ChairOnly
IS
   0.027***    
   (3.43)    
Promote_Top3Chair_Rank
IS
    0.023**   
    (2.28)   
Promote_Top5Chair_Rank
IS
     0.025***  
     (2.82)  
Promote_Top10Chair_Rank
IS
      0.022*** 
      (3.22) 
LNASSETS 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 
 (0.47) (0.44) (0.47) (0.71) (0.57) (0.44) 
LEV 0.046** 0.044** 0.045** 0.057*** 0.059*** 0.070*** 
 (2.28) (2.21) (2.07) (2.86) (2.93) (3.21) 
BM -0.026** -0.027*** -0.028** -0.023** -0.025** -0.025** 
 (-2.56) (-2.60) (-2.53) (-2.28) (-2.35) (-2.22) 
STD_SALES 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.36) (1.46) (1.44) (1.14) (1.30) (1.04) 
PCTLOSS -0.386*** -0.391*** -0.398*** -0.380*** -0.385*** -0.394*** 
 (-28.38) (-28.25) (-27.61) (-27.46) (-27.45) (-26.39) 
SG 0.045*** 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.049*** 0.045*** 
 (2.90) (2.73) (2.72) (2.79) (2.98) (2.61) 
OPLEV -0.062** -0.065** -0.063** -0.066** -0.060** -0.064* 
 (-2.09) (-2.17) (-1.98) (-2.22) (-1.97) (-1.95) 
AVGCFO -0.376*** -0.400*** -0.421*** -0.348*** -0.380*** -0.409*** 
 (-7.01) (-7.29) (-7.21) (-6.51) (-6.91) (-6.89) 
AGE 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (1.02) (1.00) (0.94) (1.00) (0.87) (0.90) 
STD_RET -0.149*** -0.148*** -0.135*** -0.144*** -0.150*** -0.143*** 
 (-3.97) (-3.83) (-3.29) (-3.88) (-3.89) (-3.51) 
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Constant 0.611*** 0.614*** 0.612*** 0.593*** 0.602*** 0.606*** 
 (11.39) (11.21) (11.06) (11.44) (11.21) (11.19) 
Observations 15,868 15,335 14,246 15,475 14,827 13,374 
R-squared 0.546 0.547 0.552 0.552 0.554 0.562 
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Panel B: Using IS1 as the income smoothing measure 
 
IS1 is the ratio of the standard deviation of income before extraordinary items to the standard deviation of 
cash flows from operations, multiplied by -1 so that higher values indicate higher income smoothing.  
 
 Dependent Variable: IS1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Promote_Top3ChairOnly
IS
 0.060**      
 (2.25)      
Promote_Top5ChairOnly
IS
  0.020     
  (0.94)     
Promote_Top10ChairOnly
IS
   0.036**    
   (2.48)    
Promote_Top3Chair_Rank
IS
    0.041**   
    (1.96)   
Promote_Top5Chair_Rank
IS
     0.027  
     (1.41)  
Promote_Top10Chair_Rank
IS
      0.025* 
      (1.84) 
LNASSETS -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 
 (-0.14) (-0.32) (-0.42) (-0.09) (-0.09) (-0.32) 
LEV 0.105** 0.101** 0.104** 0.123*** 0.117** 0.157*** 
 (2.27) (2.17) (2.09) (2.60) (2.45) (3.04) 
BM -0.035 -0.041* -0.048** -0.024 -0.030 -0.033 
 (-1.62) (-1.85) (-2.05) (-1.11) (-1.36) (-1.37) 
STD_SALES 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (3.10) (3.24) (3.44) (2.88) (2.95) (2.71) 
PCTLOSS -0.602*** -0.611*** -0.628*** -0.587*** -0.598*** -0.621*** 
 (-19.24) (-19.14) (-18.73) (-18.43) (-18.62) (-18.05) 
SG 0.023 0.018 0.017 0.028 0.034 0.021 
 (0.69) (0.51) (0.47) (0.81) (0.96) (0.54) 
OPLEV -0.092 -0.094 -0.086 -0.095 -0.093 -0.133* 
 (-1.48) (-1.49) (-1.28) (-1.51) (-1.46) (-1.93) 
AVGCFO -0.782*** -0.851*** -0.883*** -0.704*** -0.778*** -0.814*** 
 (-6.52) (-6.85) (-6.71) (-5.95) (-6.39) (-6.33) 
AGE -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (-3.56) (-3.37) (-3.34) (-3.56) (-3.46) (-3.22) 
STD_RET -0.292*** -0.312*** -0.266*** -0.281*** -0.297*** -0.274*** 
 (-3.51) (-3.68) (-2.95) (-3.35) (-3.41) (-2.97) 
Constant -0.274*** -0.256*** -0.250*** -0.322*** -0.313*** -0.288*** 
 (-3.20) (-2.91) (-2.78) (-3.97) (-3.77) (-3.32) 
Observations 15,868 15,335 14,246 15,475 14,827 13,374 
R-squared 0.503 0.507 0.512 0.509 0.513 0.523 
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Panel C: Using IS2 as the income smoothing measure 
 
IS2 is the correlation between the change in total accruals and the change in cash flow from operations, 
multiplied by -1 so that higher values indicate higher income smoothing.  
 
 Dependent Variable: IS2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Promote_Top3ChairOnly
IS
 0.015      
 (1.26)      
Promote_Top5ChairOnly
IS
  0.027**     
  (2.12)     
Promote_Top10ChairOnly
IS
   0.027***    
   (2.84)    
Promote_Top3Chair_Rank
IS
    -0.002   
    (-0.18)   
Promote_Top5Chair_Rank
IS
     0.024**  
     (2.43)  
Promote_Top10Chair_Rank
IS
      0.016** 
      (2.10) 
LNASSETS 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 
 (3.94) (3.59) (3.31) (4.07) (4.08) (3.54) 
LEV 0.025 0.020 0.017 0.033 0.032 0.021 
 (0.87) (0.69) (0.57) (1.13) (1.07) (0.66) 
BM 0.002 -0.002 -0.006 0.003 0.005 0.001 
 (0.14) (-0.13) (-0.40) (0.19) (0.34) (0.06) 
STD_SALES 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.43) (0.41) (0.16) (0.20) (0.46) (0.32) 
PCTLOSS -0.380*** -0.385*** -0.385*** -0.375*** -0.382*** -0.385*** 
 (-19.11) (-19.02) (-18.10) (-18.30) (-18.42) (-17.39) 
SG 0.002 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.002 -0.010 
 (0.08) (0.00) (-0.01) (-0.03) (0.06) (-0.40) 
OPLEV -0.070* -0.074* -0.068 -0.072* -0.058 -0.049 
 (-1.79) (-1.81) (-1.58) (-1.83) (-1.42) (-1.14) 
AVGCFO 0.093 0.069 0.056 0.105 0.085 0.033 
 (1.16) (0.90) (0.70) (1.29) (1.03) (0.38) 
AGE -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (-8.22) (-8.23) (-8.01) (-8.54) (-8.52) (-7.94) 
STD_RET -0.166*** -0.164*** -0.166*** -0.166*** -0.166*** -0.165*** 
 (-2.94) (-2.79) (-2.64) (-2.89) (-2.80) (-2.58) 
Constant 0.906*** 0.921*** 0.930*** 0.890*** 0.886*** 0.903*** 
 (18.67) (18.38) (17.92) (18.66) (17.93) (17.14) 
Observations 15,868 15,335 14,246 15,475 14,827 13,374 
R-squared 0.564 0.564 0.565 0.568 0.570 0.575 
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Table 5: Cross-sectional Variation in the Effect of Promotion Shocks on Income Smoothing 
 
This table presents OLS regression of the income smoothing measure on promotion shocks and their 
interactions with contract intensity (CI). Contract Intensity (CI) is calculated as the product of the relative 
size of government contracts and the importance of government contracts to the firm. All variables are 
defined in the Appendix. All models include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the 
state-year level and t-statistics are included in parentheses below the coefficients. All continuous variables 
are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Effect of promotion shocks and contract intensity   
 
𝐼𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝑆 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝑆 ∗ 𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + γ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  (4) 
 
 Dependent Variable: IS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Promote_Top3ChairOnly
IS
 0.020      
 (1.42)      
Promote_Top3ChairOnly
IS
*CI 0.325***      
 (5.02)      
Promote_Top5ChairOnly
IS
  0.019*     
  (1.69)     
Promote_Top5ChairOnly
IS
*CI  0.114***     
  (2.63)     
Promote_Top10ChairOnly
IS
   0.027***    
   (2.96)    
Promote_Top10ChairOnly
IS
*CI   0.056    
   (1.44)    
Promote_Top3Chair_Rank
IS
    0.018*   
    (1.67)   
Promote_Top3Chair_Rank
IS
*CI    0.181***   
    (3.01)   
Promote_Top5Chair_Rank
IS
     0.029***  
     (3.01)  
Promote_Top5Chair_Rank
IS
*CI     0.061*  
     (1.68)  
Promote_Top10Chair_Rank
IS
      0.018** 
      (2.23) 
Promote_Top10Chair_Rank
IS
*CI      0.073** 
      (2.12) 
CI 0.031 0.044 0.063** 0.031 0.057* 0.078** 
 (1.11) (1.55) (2.05) (1.09) (1.93) (2.34) 
Control Variables Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 13,681 13,150 12,061 13,289 12,652 11,285 
R-squared 0.572 0.573 0.578 0.579 0.582 0.591 
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Panel B: Effect of promotion shocks and committee seniority  
 
𝐼𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝑆 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝑆 ∗ 𝐽𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑂𝑅𝑗,𝑡 + γ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡    (5) 
 
JUNIOR is a dummy variable equal to one if the seniority of the promoted chairman is below the median.  
 
 Dependent Variable: IS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Promote_Top3ChairOnlyIS 0.014      
 (0.73)      
Promote_Top3ChairOnlyIS*JUNIOR 0.043*      
 (1.88)      
Promote_Top5ChairOnlyIS  -0.013     
  (-1.01)     
Promote_Top5ChairOnlyIS*JUNIOR  0.083***     
  (4.96)     
Promote_Top10ChairOnlyIS   0.004    
   (0.39)    
Promote_Top10ChairOnlyIS*JUNIOR   0.045***    
   (3.46)    
Promote_Top3Chair_RankIS    0.010   
    (0.75)   
Promote_Top3Chair_RankIS*JUNIOR    0.029   
    (1.59)   
Promote_Top5Chair_RankIS     -0.005  
     (-0.43)  
Promote_Top5Chair_RankIS*JUNIOR     0.064***  
     (4.50)  
Promote_Top10Chair_RankIS      0.012 
      (1.50) 
Promote_Top10Chair_RankIS*JUNIOR      0.029** 
      (2.37) 
Control Variables Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 15,868 15,335 14,246 15,475 14,827 13,374 
R-squared 0.546 0.548 0.552 0.552 0.555 0.562 
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Panel C: Effect of promotion shocks and political contributions  
 
𝐼𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝑆 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝑆 ∗ 𝑃𝐶𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑃𝐶𝑗,𝑡 + γ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡    (6) 
 
PC is an indicator variable equal to one if the firms contributed to the political campaign of the promoted 
chairman over the period from seven years before the promotion to seven years after the promotion and 
zero otherwise. The sample for this analysis consists of all firm-years in Compustat from 1989 to 2012.  
 
 Dependent Variable: IS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Promote_Top3ChairOnlyIS 0.022      
 (0.87)      
Promote_Top3ChairOnlyIS*PC -0.041      
 (-0.55)      
Promote_Top5ChairOnlyIS  0.027*     
  (1.92)     
Promote_Top5ChairOnlyIS*PC  0.050     
  (0.88)     
Promote_Top10ChairOnlyIS   0.005    
   (0.44)    
Promote_Top10ChairOnlyIS*PC   0.114**    
   (2.52)    
Promote_Top3Chair_RankIS    0.013   
    (0.86)   
Promote_Top3Chair_RankIS*PC    -0.012   
    (-0.19)   
Promote_Top5Chair_RankIS     0.033***  
     (2.71)  
Promote_Top5Chair_RankIS*PC     -0.011  
     (-0.25)  
Promote_Top10Chair_RankIS      0.006 
      (0.59) 
Promote_Top10Chair_RankIS*PC      0.080** 
      (2.27) 
PC 0.001 0.007 0.008 -0.011 -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.04) (0.50) (0.56) (-0.69) (-0.48) (-0.37) 
Control Variables Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 8,880 8,540 8,487 8,144 7,827 7,474 
R-squared 0.621 0.630 0.623 0.632 0.629 0.642 
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Table 6: The Impact of Exit Shocks on ROA and Income Smoothing  
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 +  β 𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡 + γ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
𝐼𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 +  β 𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝑆 + γ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
 
This table presents OLS regressions of ROA and income smoothing on exit shocks. An exit shock occurs if 
the senator of a given state, who once was a chairman of an influential Senate committee, vacates the 
leadership position (either chairman or ranking minority member). I set the exit shock variable 
(Exit_TopNChairOnly) as one in the year of the leader’s departure and in the subsequent four years. Exit 
shock for income smoothing tests (Exit_TopNChairOnly
IS
) is defined as one in the years +3 to +5 relative 
to the year in which the senator relinquishes his leadership. I exclude the year of the exit, years +1 and +2, 
and year +6 in my analysis due to the contamination of the income smoothing measure in these years. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. All models include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at the state-year level and t-statistics are included in parentheses below the coefficients. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. *, **, and *** represent significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: ROA Dependent Variable: ROA 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Exit_Top3ChairOnly -0.003   
 (-0.74)   
Exit_Top5ChairOnly  -0.007**  
  (-2.27)  
Exit_Top10ChairOnly   -0.005** 
   (-2.10) 
Control Variables Included Included Included 
Observations 16,493 16,493 16,493 
R-squared 0.588 0.588 0.588 
 
Panel B: Income Smoothing Dependent Variable: IS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Exit_Top3ChairOnly
IS
 -0.025*   
 (-1.83)   
Exit_Top5ChairOnly
IS
  -0.023**  
  (-2.49)  
Exit_Top10ChairOnly
IS
   -0.009 
   (-1.00) 
Control Variables Included Included Included 
Observations 15,973 15,563 14,941 
R-squared 0.544 0.544 0.548 
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Table 7: The Impact of Promotion Shocks on Report Readability   
𝐹𝑜𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛼𝑡 +  β 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡 + γ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
 
This table presents OLS regression of the measure of report readability (the Fog index) on promotion 
shocks. Fog is defined as (words per sentence + percent of complex words) * 0.4 where complex words are 
defined as words with three syllables or more (Li 2008). Control variables include book-to-market ratio 
(BM), firm size (LNASSETS), volatility of earnings (VOLROE), volatility of stock returns (STD_RET), firm 
age (AGE) and special items (P_SPI) as control variables. All variables are defined in the Appendix. All 
models include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year level and t-
statistics are included in parentheses below the coefficients. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 
1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Sample firm-years from 1993 to 2012    
 
  
 Dependent Variable: Fog 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Promote_Top3ChairOnly -0.147      
 (-0.86)      
Promote_Top5ChairOnly  0.031     
  (0.29)     
Promote_Top10ChairOnly   0.011    
   (0.13)    
Promote_Top3Chair_Rank    0.382***   
    (2.62)   
Promote_Top5Chair_Rank     0.131  
     (1.32)  
Promote_Top10Chair_Rank      0.132 
      (1.56) 
Control Variables Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 5,085 5,085 5,085 5,085 5,085 5,085 
R-squared 0.458 0.458 0.458 0.459 0.458 0.458 
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Panel B: Firm-years with high government contract intensity from 1993 to 2012   
 
  
 Dependent Variable: Fog 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Promote_Top3ChairOnly -0.528      
 (-1.55)      
Promote_Top5ChairOnly  0.312     
  (1.55)     
Promote_Top10ChairOnly   0.333**    
   (2.01)    
Promote_Top3Chair_Rank    0.445*   
    (1.88)   
Promote_Top5Chair_Rank     0.447***  
     (2.69)  
Promote_Top10Chair_Rank      0.535*** 
      (3.75) 
Control Variables Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172 
R-squared 0.515 0.516 0.517 0.517 0.518 0.522 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition  
INCOME SMOOTHING  
IS Average of the reversed fractional ranking of IS1 and IS2 each year  
IS1 The ratio of the standard deviation of income before extraordinary 
items to the standard deviation of cash flow from operations, both 
scaled by lagged total assets, multiplied by -1. It is calculated using 
rolling windows of five years that include the current year and the 
past four years.  
IS2 The contemporaneous correlation between the changes in total 
accruals and the changes in cash flow from operations, both scaled 
by lagged total assets, multiplied by -1. It is calculated using rolling 
windows of five years that include the current year and the past four 
years. 
Total accruals are calculated as Δ current assets – Δ current liabilities 
- Δ cash + Δ short-term debt – depreciation. Cash flow from 
operations is calculated as income before extraordinary items – total 
accruals.  
 
PROMOTION SHOCKS 
 
Promote_TopNChairOnly An indicator variable equal to one in the year the senator of a given 
state is promoted to be the chairman of one of the top-N-ranked 
Senate committees and in the following six years, and zero 
otherwise. N = 3, 5, or 10  
The list of the 10 most influential Senate committees is from 
Edwards and Stewart (2006) and includes Finance, Veterans Affairs, 
Appropriations, Rules, Armed Services, Foreign Relations, 
Intelligence, Judiciary, Budget, and Commerce.  
Promote_TopNChair_Rank An indicator variable equal to one in the year the senator of a given 
state is promoted to be the chairman or the ranking minority member 
of one of the top-N-ranked Senate committees and in the following 
six years, and zero otherwise. N = 3, 5, or 10 
PromoteYr_TopNChairOnly An indicator variable equal to one in the year the senator of a given 
state is promoted to be the chairman of one of the top-N-ranked 
Senate committees, and zero otherwise. N = 3, 5, or 10 
PromoteYr_TopNChair_Rank An indicator variable equal to one in the year the senator of a given 
state is promoted to be the chairman or the ranking minority member 
of one of the top-N-ranked Senate committees and zero otherwise. N 
= 3, 5, or 10 
Promote_TopNChairOnly
IS
 An indicator variable equal to one for years +3 to +6 relative to the 
promotion year that the senator of a given state is newly appointed as 
a chairman of one of the top-N-ranked Senate Committees, and zero 
otherwise. I drop event years 0 to +2, +7 and +8. N = 3, 5, or 10  
Promote_TopNChair_Rank
IS
 An indicator variable equal to one for years +3 to +6 relative to the 
promotion year that the senator of a given state is newly appointed as 
a chairman or a ranking minority member of one of the top-N-ranked 
Senate Committees, and zero otherwise. I drop event years 0 to +2, 
+7, and +8. N = 3, 5, or 10  
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Exit_TopNChairOnly An indicator variable equal to one in the year of the leader’s 
departure and in the subsequent four years. An exit shock occurs if 
the senator of a given state, who once was a chairman of an 
influential Senate committee, vacates the leadership position (either 
chairman or ranking minority member). N = 3, 5, or 10 
Exit_TopNChairOnly
IS
 An indicator variable equal to one in the years +3 to +5 relative to 
the year in which the senator relinquishes his leadership of a top-N-
ranked Senate committee. I exclude the year of the exit, years +1 and 
+2, and year +6. N = 3, 5, or 10 
 
OTHER VARIABLES 
 
ROA Income before extraordinary items divided by previous year’s total 
assets  
LogSalesGov The logarithm of one plus total sales to the U.S. government  
Cumulative Abnormal 
Return (CAR) 
Sum of the difference between the firm’s stock return and the value 
weighted market return over the event window beginning one day 
prior to the event date on which the promotion is determined and 
ending one and three trading days after the event 
LogRet The logarithm of one plus the return over a year following the 
promotion  
ContractIntensity (CI) A product of the relative size of government contracts and the 
importance of government contracts to the firm. The relative size of 
government contracts is an indicator variable that equals one if the 
level of a firm's government contracts is in the top 10% of the 
distribution of government contracts over the previous three years. 
The importance of government contracts to the firm is measured as 
the percentage of the firm's sales to the government averaged over 
the previous three years. 
JUNIOR An indicator variable equal to one if the committee seniority of the 
promoted chairman (or ranking minority member) is below the 
median committee seniority across all the promoted chairmen (or 
ranking minority member) of the top 10 Senate committees and zero 
otherwise 
Political Contributions 
(PC) 
An indicator variable equal to one if the firms contributed to the 
political campaign of the promoted chairman over the period from 
seven years before the promotion to seven years after the promotion 
and zero otherwise. 
Fog 
(words per sentence + percent of complex words) * 0.4 where 
complex words are defined as words with three syllables or more 
BM The ratio of book value to market value of equity 
LNASSETS The logarithm of total assets measured in millions of U.S. dollars  
MVE Market value of the equity  
Herfindahl_Index (HF) 
Herfindahl index calculated as the sum of the squares of the market 
shares of the firms within the industry 
CAPX/Sales Capital expenditures scaled by sales  
LEV Total debt divided by total assets 
STD_RET Standard deviation of previous 12 month’s monthly stock returns 
CAPITAL_INTENSITY The ratio of fixed assets to total assets  
STD_SALES The standard deviation of sales over the last five years   
   
60 
PCTLOSS 
The proportion of years that a firm experiences losses over the past 
five years 
SalesGrowth(SG) The average sales growth measured over the last five years 
OPLEV Net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets  
AVGCFO 
Average cash flow from operations divided by total assets measured 
over the last five years  
AGE Years since first appearance in Compustat  
VOLROE 
Variance of ROE, where ROE is calculated as net income over the 
book value of equity  
Special Items/Assets Special items divided by total assets  
 
